I most certainly agree with you Patrice, that to be effective in managing the communication and warning aspects of a response to an incident, one needes to consider social media. Not only is it a factor by itself, but the traditional media also monitors social media as an information source.  As social media is a relatively new phenomenon much of the emergency management community has not figured out how to deal with it or considers it a fad which will pass. That doe snot make it any less of a factor which needs to be considered. 

Thank you for bringing this document to our attention, hopefully it will generate some productive discussion and will result in improving the subject document.  I want to read the whole document and may have some additional comments. 

Does the whole document become suspect??? I looked at the SAR component and see no reference to the current SAR volunteers that look for lost persons and the deceased and have been utilized in emergency situations to do notification ( a form of communications), assist with evacuation and conduct "windshield surveys" to name a few.

This, along with the social media information (and maybe other material I have not read yet) make me wonder about who developed this.

In answer to your question about who developed it, here is a link to the section of the CBP web site which provides contacts to ask that question and the logon page provides some insights regarding membership. It looks like you have to be approved to gain access to the site.  I find it interesting that there has been no reference to it on the Canadian Standards Association Technical Committee which is upgrading the Z 1600 Canadian emergency management and business continuity standard. 

I could not agree more.  It comes down to using all the communication channels effectively. The Internet is here to stay and is moving fast.

Thanks Patrice,

heather

Perhaps we need to provide some assistance to the authors of this document!

We are still in a formative stage of integrating social media into emergency communications but not to even reference social media as a viable channel for message delivery and two-way communications during an event, is a profound flaw.

Having worked on joint projects with the federal government, e.g. G8/G20, we know that there are praticioners in those agencies that use social media.

Someone dropped the ball!

I for one would like to know who were the +250 individuals who were chosen to have input into the 'grand overall document' and who specifically was the lead with Chapter 28.  I would guess that once found out, the reason d'etre for the approach taken would become obvious; they are simply not "in touch" with reality and today's media choices, including social media.

Just take a look at the 2 most recent horrific disasters that happened this year; Christchurch, NZ and in Japan.  The social media was front and center and 1st off the mark.

Hopefully there will be enough comment to have that specific chapter re-written; however, it makes one wonder if all the chapters were written by individuals thinking in the 1990's.

I located a page which provides an overview of the initiative and and files which can be downloaded for each section of the capability based planning initiative and I attached an executive summary for your information. 

I believe that you have to look a little deeper. Social media has not yet made the list of "invited guests" for emergency communications in any government IT department (federal or provincial). There are many organizations that look at social media very skeptically. Why? Because of the human factor. Every organization has an element within that either innocently or wilfully misuses this communication vehicle and causes system problems - viruses, hacks, information leaks (does WikiLeaks sound familiar?) and other problems such as excessive consumption of bandwidth. Large organizations are leery about exposing sensitive network information to the public through any electronic means. Many companies have spent years and many dollars on secure IT systems to prevent or minimize such a problem. The person(s) who wrote this document clearly had a mandate governed by specific guidelines to address the issue within IT policy. Many years and much lobbying passed before communications interoperability finally received government support. Using social media for emergency communications will be following the same path until we can put safe operations procedures in place that will be acceptable under public and organizational scrutiny.

I appreciate very much where Michael Dube is coming from with his comment on this article, having worked for an organization where the IT department (policies and capabilities) were often well behind what the organization needed to work effectively.  Unfortunately, whether or not social media has been invited to participate in government or corporate crisis and emergency communication processes, does not alter that it is now a fact of life and will significantly impact crisis and emergency communication. If an organization is not aware of what is being said about it or its response to an incident in social media and if it is not able to use social media communication tools for policy or technical reasons, it and the senior personnel within that organization will simply have to suffer whatever negative consequences there may be as a result of those limitations.  I am not saying that there will always be negative consequences, but the risk is certainly there and needs to be considered along with the potential risks of using social media. Appropriate policies and procedures should be able to mitigate the risks of using social media but they won't likely help the risks of not using it. 

Hi Michael,

Please don't feel that we are ganging up on your comment regarding social media and IT security requirements. As emergency communicators, we are frustrated in our attempts to keep all relevant sectors of emergency response organizations abreast of the profound change in the public's use of social media for obtaining key information during a crisis. Bill MacKay does point out the potiential negative impacts to an emergency response agency, of not being part of the conversation.

As emergency communicators, we have put considerable time and effort in coming to terms with the social media phenomena. We have worked to develop a strategy to deliver key messages in this new environment to meet the new public expectations.

The IT security conversation is one with which I am familiar. In attempts to keep with the times, I have talked with news directors for national television networks on their current use of 'Skype' as means of capturing news interviews. The barrier for emergency response agencies has been the refusal of IT to permit the software's use by the PIO. I understand the security argument...however, just like the public's use of Twitter and Facebook, the media are already out there with new tools and expecting us to respond through these channels.

Time has arrived for all parties in our agencies to have a thorough conversation regarding these new 'realities'.

Thanks Barry, We appreciate the comments from our IT friends as we need them to put the connections in place to effectively monitor and use social media. 

I thought I should place a link here to the excellent compendium on the Improving Crisis and Emergency Communications Practices project you and Patrice led. It is an excellent resource and I want to make sure our viewers and members don't overlook it. 

I also came across across a blog article in the Risk Management Monitor on Self Inflicted Reputation Damage involving social media. It does not address the standards or IT issues but I think it adds to the discussion by underlining the importance of using social media properly. 

Hi all,

Bill has asked that I post some information on capabilities-based planning (CBP) as emergency planning models was the focus of some of my Masters research. Below is some history around CBP and its application in Canada and the US.

As a quick primer, think of CBP like the process an athlete would follow when setting out to win a gold medal. The athlete would look at the performance level needed for a gold standing; they would then tailor their training program to acheive that performance. Every decision they make in their training program focuses on acheiving that performance level - from the equipment they purchase, their exercise regime, the timelines they follow, and the milestones they need to meet. The training program does more than improve the athlete's performance; it ingrains the specific way the athlete will perform.

Perhaps the biggest consideration when using CBP in emergency management is determining what we mean by a "gold medal" performance. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security has set a National Preparedness Goal. In Canada, we appear to be relying on the insight of subject matter experts if customizing US materials. This may explain some of our challenges. 

Cheers, Darren

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The concept of Capabilities-based planning originated with the American military. In the past, the military would focus on look at major conflicts and try to plan for all possible contingencies (this was called the "bounding-threat" model). For example, military planners may decide that North Korea invading South Korea was a realistic scenario that would require the deployment of US forces. Military planners would then plan extensively around all aspects of this scenario - troop numbers, resources required, timelines, and so forth. Not only was this expensive and time consuming, the resulting plans were usually non-transferrable to other situations. 

Capabilities-based planning was adopted as a means of replacing this model. This new theory said the context wasn't as important as the particular activities the military would need to perform. It didn't matter if the fight was in Iraq, North Korea, or Iran; in each case, the same basic practices would be used. For example, the US military maintains a capability for parachuting troops into a war zone. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has determined it is sufficient to limit this capability to brigade-level parachute drops (approximately 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers). The DoD can apply this capability in almost any war setting.

There is a major planning implication with this scenario: the DoD now needs to ensure that 5,000 soldiers are trained, equipped and ready for a parachute drop at any given time. This means there have to be processes in place to get the soldiers to the fight, aircraft for them to jump out of, recent training in the best practices of parachuting, etc.

This leads to a major challenge: how much of each capability is enough? This is determined by identifying "Planning Scenarios", which represent the minimum number of possible events necessary to illustrate the range of potential incidents. In other words, military planners identify a small number of scenarios that cover all of the activities that the military may need to provide. Using the above example, the DoD could have determined that the capability should include the ability to perform a division-level parachute drop (approximately 10,000-16,000 soldiers). However, the DoD would have looked at their planning scenarios and determined that there would never be a need to drop this many soldiers at a time. The trick is, planners should have focus on having the minimum number of scenarios as this allows the identification of the broadest capabilities. Too many scenarios means too many & too detailed capabilities.

Once military planners figure out how much of each capability they need, they begin to "engineer" the capability. This is no small feat as it entails training staff, changing structures and processes, purchasing equipment, rewriting plans, etc. It takes an average of 12-15 years for a new military capability to be rolled out.

It is not that the capability then becomes mandatory - rather, once the capability is rolled out there is technically no other way to perform the task as the organization has transformed itself to deliver that capability.

So how does this relate to emergency management? Following the 9-11 attacks and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), President Bush issued a Presidential Directive requiring the DHS follow a capabilities-based planning approach. This approach mirrored the military model in that the DHS developed 15 Planning Scenarios to determine all of the activities that are required from the emergency management community. These activities are listed in a document called the Universal Task List. Once this List was completed, the individual tasks were grouped together based on criteria such as when the task would be performed, the location it would be completed, the resources it requires, etc. These groupings make up the basis of each Capability and are recorded on the Target Capabilities List (TCL).

The TCL organizes and groups the tasks in the UTL into formal capabilities - 37 in total. Each capability contains formal definitions, outcomes, preparedness and performance activities, tasks, and measures related to specific areas of emergency management (e.g., Emergency Operations Centre, Communications, et.c). The purpose of the TCL is to help jurisdictions understand what their preparedness roles and responsibilities are during a major incident - in other words, it describes the tasks and level of performance they are expected to demonstrate in order to prevent, protect against, respond to, or recover from a disaster. To that end, the TCL is meant to be a planning, assessment, and training tool to be used by the emergency management community. However, it is worth noting that in the US the performance measures listed in each task are not taken to be considered formal standards, though they reflect nationally accepted standards of performance, benchmarks, and guidelines. Nonetheless, achieving the performance measures listed in each capability is required for accessing DHS funding.

As with the military model, engineering each capability is a transformative experience for each jurisdiction. People are trained, equipment is purchased, exercises are standardized, formal evaluation takes place, plans are rewritten. The interoperability that is sought in emergency management comes from there being a consistent set of capabilities across the nation. Keep in mind that this is all supported at the federal level through a formal Presidential Directive and a National Preparedness Goal that supports this process from the top down.

Canada, on the other hand, is formally committed to a risk-based planning model. A risk-based model requires the jurisdiction to identify local risks and to determine what (if anything) should be done to prepare for potential emergencies. The focus is on identifying and managing local risks prior to a disaster occurring; response and recovery are seen as the management of consequences, the impact of which was assessed based on the level of mitigation/preparation activities. This is important as there will be cases in which community stakeholders will decide to invest heavily in mitigation activities, while other communities may focus solely on response. While this may seem confusing (or in some cases, even alarming), it is a reflection of the level of risk-acceptance of local stakeholders. In essence, the community determines the level of risk they are willing to accept; they then "own" the consequences of those decisions. Ultimately, it supports the notion that we can't avoid all risks, and that living with certain risks may be both prudent and safe. The decision to accept risks may be based on money, local culture, frequency of disaster, etc. These concepts are laid out in the Public Safety Canada document An Emergency Management Framework for Canada (http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/emfrmwrk-2011-eng.aspx)

Where things get a little dicey is in marrying these two planning models. From a technical standpoint, they are very different: risk-based planning focuses on the interpretation of local risks and tailoring preparation activities to meet local desires, while capabilities-based planning focuses on averaging national risks and standardizing response activities across the country. There are clearly areas where these two models can complement one another but there will need to be trade-offs.